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Abstract
Stochastic games provide a framework for interactions among multi-agents and enable a myriad of applications.
In these games, agents decide on actions simultaneously, the state of an agent moves to the next state, and each agent
receives a reward. However, finding an equilibrium (if exists) in this game is often difficult when the number of
agents become large. This paper focuses on finding a mean-field equilibrium (MFE) in an action coupled stochastic
game setting in an episodic framework. It is assumed that the impact of the other agents’ can be assumed by the
empirical distribution of the mean of the actions. All agents know the action distribution and employ lower-myopic
best response dynamics to choose the optimal oblivious strategy. This paper proposes a posterior sampling based
approach for reinforcement learning in the mean-field game, where each agent samples a transition probability from
the previous transitions. We show that the policy and action distributions converge to the optimal oblivious strategy
and the limiting distribution, respectively, which constitute a MFE.
I. INTRODUCTION
We are living in a world where multiple agents interact repeatedly over a common environment. For example,
multiple robots interact to achieve a specific goal. The multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) refers to the
problem of learning and planning in a sequential decision making system when the underlying system dynamics are
unknown, and may need to be learnt by trying different options and observing their actions. Learning in a MARL
is fundamentally different from the traditional single-agent reinforcement learning problem (RL) since agents not
only interact with the environment but also with each other. Thus, an agent when tries to learn the underlying
system dynamics has to consider the action taken by the other actions. Changes in the policy (or, action) of an
agent affects the others and vice-versa.
One natural learning algorithm is to extend the RL algorithms to the MARL by assuming that the other agents’
actions are independent. However, the studies show that a smart agent who learns the joint actions of the others
performs better compared to the ones which do not [7]. Hence, it is futile to consider that an agent will not indulge
itself to learn the joint actions of the others. When the agents are strategic, i.e., they only want to take actions
which maximize their own utility (or, value), Nash equilibrium is often employed as the equilibrium concept. The
existing equilibrium solving approaches are only capable of solving a handful of agents and for some restricted
games (when there exists an adversarial equilibrium or coordination equilibrium) [5]. The computational complexity
of finding Nash Equilibrium at every stage game [4] prevents those approaches to be applied in games where the
number of agents is large.
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2In this paper, we consider a MARL where a large number of agents co-exist. Similar to [10], we revert to the
mean-field approach where we assume that the Q-function of an agent is affected by the mean actions of the
others. Mean-field game drastically reduces the complexity since an agent only now needs to consider the empirical
distribution of the actions played by other agents. Further, we consider an oblivious strategy [1], where each agent
takes an action based only on its own state. An agent does not have to track the policy evolution of the other agents.
Unlike [10], we consider a generalized version of the game where the state can be different for different agents.
Further, we do not consider a game where the adversarial equilibrium or coordinated equilibrium is required to be
present. We also do not need to track the action and the realized Q-value of other agents as was the case in [10].
Mean-field games exist in several domains. For example, the mean-field game is observed in an security game
where a large number of agents make individual decisions about their own security. However, the ultimate security
depends on the decisions made by other agents. For example, in a network of computers, if an agent invests heavily
in building firewalls, its computer can still be breached if the agents’ computers are not secure. In the security
game, each agent invests a certain amount to attain a security level, however, the investment level depends on the
investment made by the other agents. If the number of agents is large, the game can be modeled as the mean-field
game as the average investment made by per agent impacts the decision of an agent.
Another example of mean-field game is the demand response price in the smart grid. The utility company sets a
price based on the average demand per household, hence, at a certain time, the average demand is high, the agent
may want to reduce its consumption in order to decrease the price.
Unlike the standard literature on the mean-field equilibrium on stochastic games [1], [9], [2], we consider that the
transition probabilities are unknown to the agents. Instead, each agent learns the underlying transition probability
matrix a readily implementable posterior sampling approach [3], [6]. All agents employ best response dynamics
to choose the best response strategy which maximizes the discounted payoff for the remaining episode length. We
show the asymptotic convergence of the policy and the action distribution to the optimal oblivious strategy and the
limiting action distribution, respectively, and the converged point constitutes a mean-field equilibrium (MFE). We
use the compactness of state and action space for the convergence. We estimate the value function using update
steps which are similar to the Expected Sarsa algorithm [8] and show that the iterates converge to the optimal value
function of the true distribution.
The key contribution of the paper is a novel algorithm that is used by each agent in a multi-agent setting, which
is shown to converge to a mean-field equilibrium. The proposed algorithm does not assume the knowledge of
transition probabilities, and learns them using a posterior sampling approach.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Stochastic Game
An n-player stochastic game is formalized by the tuple M = {S,A, rM, pM, τ, ρ γ}, where the parameters are
defined as follows. The state of the ith agent at time t is given by si,t ∈ S, where S is the state space set. A(s) is
defined as the set of the feasible actions an agent can take in state s. A is the action space set defined as
⋃
s∈S A(s).
If the state of the agent i at time t is given by si,t = s and the action taken by the agent j is given by aj,t = aj ,
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3then the next state is s′ ∈ S with probability pM(s′|s, a1, . . . , an) which is assumed to be same for all the agents.
rMi (s, a, a−i) is the probability distribution over the realized reward by the agent i when action a is selected in
the state s, a−i is the action taken by all other agents. It is assumed to be similar for each agent with support [0,1].
The constant γ ∈ [0, 1) is the discount factor. ρ is the initial state distribution.
We consider an episodic framework where the length of the time horizon is τ . State space set S, action space
set A, τ are deterministic and need not be learned by the agent. We consider that the game is played in episodes
k = 0, 1, 2, . . . . The length of each episode is given by τ . In each episode, the game is played in discrete steps,
j = 1, 2, ..., τ . The episodes begin at times tk = (k− 1)τ +1, k = 1, 2, 3, . . . . At each time t, the state of the agent
i is given by si,t, the agent selects an action ai,t, agent observes a scalar reward ri,t and the state transitions to the
state st+1. Let Hi,t = (s1,1, a1,1, r1,1, . . . si,t−1, ai,t−1, ri,t−1) denote the history of the agent i till time t.
B. Problem Formulation
In a game with a large number of players, we might expect that the fluctuations of the agents’ action will
“average out”. Since the effect of other agents on a single agent’s payoff is only via the actions of the population,
it is intuitive that as the number of agents increases, a single agent has negligible effect on the game. This intuition
is formalized as the mean field equilibrium.
Let α−i,t(a
m) be the fraction of the agents (excluding agent i that take action am at time t. Mathematically, for
m = 1, . . . , D (where D = |A| is the size of the action space set), We have
α−i,t(a
m) =
1
n− 1
∑
j 6=i
1(aj,t = a
m), (1)
where 1(aj,t = a
m) is the indicator function that the action taken by the agent j at time t is am.
In mean field equilibrium, each agent makes an action based on the average of the population actions. Thus
the agent doesn’t need to concern itself with the action of the other agents, it just needs to keep the track of the
averages of the population actions. Thus, the actions of other players are taken using the set α−i,t as the proportion
of actions of the other players. Each agent conjectures that the next state is randomly distributed according to the
transition probability measure pM:
s′ ∼ pM(·|si,t, ai,t, α−i,t) (2)
Note that we assume that the transition probabilities are unknown and are learned using the posterior sampling
algorithm described in Section III. Since each player is only concerned with its current state and the average action
of the population, we describe a set of strategies which is known as oblivious strategy.
Definition 1. In an oblivious strategy, the set of policies available to the agent is given by
Λ = {π : S ×R→ A|π(s) ∈ A(s)∀s ∈ S} (3)
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4Consider π, an oblivious policy followed by the agent i that maps each state s ∈ S and average action of other
agents to an action a ∈ A. We now define a value function for the agent i for oblivious policy π at ℓth time step
as:
VMπ,ℓ (s|α) = EM,π


τ−1∑
j=ℓ
γj−ℓr¯M(sj , π(sj , j), α)|sℓ = s, π

 (4)
where r¯M(si, ai, α−i) is the expected reward realized by the agent i in state si when action ai is selected. It
is clear that the action ai = π(si, α−i). Since we mainly consider one agent decision, index i will be dropped at
places where the agent index is unambiguous. The index will also be dropped from α−i to denote the limiting
distribution or the long-run average population distribution. Each agent determines the policy based on limiting
distribution α. However, the decision of agents (π) impact the limiting distribution α. An equilibrium is established
if and only if the the decisions π do not change the values of α. Thus the agents need to be aware of the long-run
action distribution α to make their decision.
Since the action space and state space are finite, the set of strategies available to the players is also finite. The
player adopts the lower-myopic best response dynamics to choose the policy. As time proceeds, the strategies and
the action distribution converge to the asymptotic equilibrium [1]. Therefore, we have dropped time index from the
action distribution to represent the limiting distribution.
The above defined value function satisfies the Bellman-property for finite horizon MDPs, given by
VMπ,ℓ (s|α = r¯
M(s, π(s, ℓ), α) + γ
∑
s′∈S
pM (s′|s, π(s, ℓ + 1), α)VMπ,ℓ+1(s
′|α) (5)
The proof of the above expression is given in the Appendix A.
We also define the Q-function as:
QMπ,ℓ(s, a|α) = r¯
M(s, a, α) + γ
∑
s′∈S
pM (s′|s, a, α)VMπ,ℓ+1(s
′|α) (6)
We, now, define the optimal oblivious strategy:
Definition 2. The set P(α) maps a distribution α to the set of the optimal oblivious strategies which are chosen
from the Q-function In other words, for a given α, a policy π¯ ∈ P(α) if and only if
π(s, j) = argmax
a
QMµ,j(s, a|α)∀s ∈ S&j = 0, 1, . . . , τ − 1 (7)
Here, the policy π(s, j) is used at jth time step so that the Q value QMπ,j(s) is maximized for all states s ∈ S.
Note that π(s, j) does not depend on the distribution α. Hence, it is a state oblivious strategy where each agent
takes its decision based on its own strategy only. The set P(α) can be empty however in the subsequent section
we’ll show that the set P(α) is non-empty under the assumptions used in this paper. Note that with slight abuse
of notation, we denote π(s, j) as the strategy which has been learnt till episode j.
Suppose all agents play the optimal oblivious strategy π¯ ∈ P(α). The initial population state distribution denoted
by f evolves with all the agents knowing the limiting action distribution α and play according to the optimal
oblivious strategy π¯, then if the long run state distribution is equal to the initial state distribution f , the distribution
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5f is said be invariant of the dynamics induced by α and π¯. We denote the set of all such state distributions through
a map D(π¯, α).
We assume that an agent observes the action distribution, however, it does not observe the state of the other
agents. Thus, an agent does not know the probability transition matrix and will try to estimate it from the past
observations as described in the next section.
III. PROPOSED ALGORITHM
In this section, we propose an algorithm, which will be shown to converge to the mean field equilibrium (MFE)
in the following section. For each agent i, the algorithm begins with a prior distribution g over the stochastic
game with state space set S and action space set A and time horizon τ . The game is played episodes k =
0, 1, 2, · · · . The length of each episode is given by τ . In each episode, the game is played in discrete steps,
j = 1, 2, · · · , τ . The episodes begin at times tk = (k − 1)τ + 1, k = 1, 2, 3, · · · . At each time t, the state of the
agent is given by st, it selects an action at, and observes a scalar reward rt then transitions to the state st+1. Let
Ht = (s1, a1, α1, r1, . . . st, at−1, αt−1, rt−1) denote the history of the agent till time t.
At the beginning of each episode, the MDP, Mtk is sampled from the posterior distribution conditioned on
the history Htk . The sampled action distribution is represented by αtk . We assume that after some samples, αtk
has converged. Till the time αtk does not converge, the proposed algorithm will not converge. The updated value
function in the last iteration is used to calculate the optimal oblivious policy πk ∈ P(αtk) and follows it for the
entire episode. Recall for a given α, a policy π ∈ P(α) if and only if π(s, j) = argmaxaQ
Mt
k
πk,j
(s, a|α) for all
s ∈ S and j = 0, 1, . . . , τ − 1. But to choose the policy πk form the set P(αtk) we use lower myopic learning
dynamics, where at each episode we choose the strategy which is infimum of the set P(αtk) or the value p(αtk).
We note that Mtk is used in the algorithm instead of M
∗ where M∗ is the true distribution, since M∗ is not
known. In order to obtain an estimate, each agent samples a transition probability matrix according to the posterior
distribution. Each agent follows the strategy πk according to the Q-values over the episode. Based on action decision
by each agent, we update the value function and the Q-function based on the obtained reward functions which
depend on the value of αtk . This update is akin to learning the value function in Expected Sarsa algorithm [8]. The
detailed algorithm steps can be seen in Algorithm 1. We note that, after the algorithm converges, the value of α
converges and thus all the transition probabilities and value functions depend on the limiting distribution. We use
Mk as a shorter notation to represent Mtk
Here qjk(sj , aj) is used as an estimate of the value Q
Mk
πk,j
(s, a, αtk) and v
j
k(sj) is used as an estimate for
VMkπk,j (sj |αtk) which is updated over the episodes in a way similar to the Expected Sarsa algorithm. The iteration
is as follows:
vjk(st + 1) =
∑
a∈A
πk(st+1, j)q
j
k(st+1, a) (8)
qjk+1(st, at) = (1− βk)q
j
k(st, at) + βk(rj(st, at, αtk) + γv
j
k(st+1))) (9)
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6where qjk(st, at) is the estimate of the Q
Mk
πk,j
(st, at|αtk) where it is obvious that t = (k − 1)τ + j and v
j
k is the
estimate of VMkπk,j (st|αtk) in the k
th episode.
Algorithm 1 Proposed Algorithm for Mean Field Game with Best Response Learning Dynamics
1: Input: Prior distribution g, time horizon τ , γ, initial state distribution ρ
2: Output: The strategy π
3: Initialize vj(s) = 0, qj(s, a) = 0 ∀ a, s, j = 0, · · · , τ − 1.
4: for episodes k = 1, 2, · · · do
5: Estimate transition probability p(sj+1|sj , aj) based on the last episodes.
6: for timesteps j = 0, . . . , τ − 1 do
7: Compute πk(s, j) = argmaxa q
j(s, a) and choose the lowest order action
8: Apply aj = πk(sj , j)
9: Observe reward rj , action of the agent aj , average action of population αj and next state sj+1
10: Update value function: vj(sj+1) =
∑
a∈A πk(sj+1, j)q
j(sj+1, a)
11: Update Q function: qj(sj , aj) = (1− βk)q
j(sj , aj) + βk(rj + γv
j(sj+1))
12: end for
13: end for
Let
L(a¯, a, s) = E[α(t+ 1)− α(t)|α(t) = α¯, at = a, st = s], (10)
where α(t) is the limiting distribution of other agents at time t and L(·) denotes the expected changes in the limiting
action distribution when an agent selects the action a. We make the following assumptions throughput the paper.
Assumption 1. We assume that for all s ∈ S and some p ∈ [1,∞), the following hold.
||L(a¯, a, s)− L(a¯′, a, s)||p ≤ K||a
′ − a||p (11)
||L(a¯, a, s)− L(a¯′, a′, s)||p ≤ K1(||a¯
′ − a¯||p + d(ai, a
′
i)) (12)
|rM (s, a, a¯′)− rM (s, a, a¯)| ≤ K2||a¯
′ − a||∞ (13)
where K , K1, and K2 are positive constants.
The above assumption is equivalent to the conditions Lipschitz continuity of rM (·) and L(·). We further assume
that the values of βt used to update Q-function in the algorithm satisfy the following.
Assumption 2. We assume that βt → 0 as t→∞. Further,
∑
t βt =∞ and
∑
t β
2
t is finite.
IV. CONVERGENCE RESULT
In this section, we’ll show that if the oblivious strategy is chosen according to the proposed algorithm, then the
oblivious strategy π and the limiting population action distribution α constitutes a Mean Field Equilibrium (MFE).
More formally, we have
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7Theorem 1. The optimal oblivious strategy obtained from the Algorithm 1 and the limiting action distribution
constitute a mean-field equilibrium and the value function obtained from the algorithm converges to the optimal
value function of the true distribution.
The rest of the section proves this result. We first note that the lower-myopic best response strategy leads to a
convergence of the action strategy following the results in [1] for finite action space and state space. The key intuition
for the lower-myopic strategy is to avoid conflicts when there is non-unique strategy at the agent that maximizes
the value function which might lead to choosing different strategies at different iterations if lower myopic is not
used. Further, any way of resolving the multiple optimas could be used, including upper-myopic giving the same
result. Having shown that α converges, we now proceed to show that the converged point of the algorithm results
in a MFE.
We first show the conditions needed for a policy π, a population state f , and action distribution α to constitute
an MFE (Section IV-A). Then, we show that the conditions for the policy to be MFE given in Section IV-A are
met for any optimal oblivious strategy (Section IV-B). Thus, the key property that is required to show the desired
result is that the proposed algorithm leads to an optimal oblivious strategy. In order to show that, we first show
that the optimal oblivious strategy set is non-empty (Section IV-C). Then, we show that the value function of
the sampled distribution converges to the true distribution (Section IV-D). However, we do not estimate the value
function directly based on the samples, while use Expected Sarsa updates for the estimate of the value function.
Thus, we finally show that the iterates of the value function obtained from the algorithm converge to the optimal
value function of the sampled distribution. (Section 4.5). This combined with the result in Section IV-D shows that
the update of the value function steps eventually converge to the value function with knowledge of true underlying
distribution of the transition probability M∗, thus proving that the proposed algorithm converges to an optimal
oblivious strategy which constitute a mean field equilibrium thus proving the theorem.
A. Conditions for a Strategy to be a MFE
In this section, we will describe the conditions for an oblivious strategy π to be a MFE. In Section II-B, we
defined two maps P(α) and D(µ, α). For a given action coupled stochastic game, the map P(α) for a given
population action distribution α gives the set of the optimal oblivious strategies. Further, the map D(µ, α) for a
given population action distribution α and oblivious strategy µ gives the set of invariant population state distribution
f.
We define the map Dˆ(µ, α) which gives the induced population distribution α induced from the oblivious
strategy µ and the population state distribution f. The following lemma gives the conditions that the stochastic
game constitutes a mean field equilibrium. These conditions have been provided in [1], and the reader is referred
to [1] for further details and proof of this result.
Lemma 1. An action coupled stochastic game with the strategy π, population state distribution f and population
action distribution α constitute a mean field equilibrium if π ∈ P(α), f ∈ D(π, α) and α = Dˆ(π, f).
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8B. Conditions of Lemma 1 are met for any Optimal Oblivious Strategy
In this section, we show that the conditions of Lemma 1 are met for any optimal oblivious strategy. In the mean
field equilibrium, each agent plays according to the strategy π ∈ P(α). If the long run average population action
distribution is α, and each agent takes an oblivious strategy, hence, we must have the evolution of the state space
such that the oblivious strategy on those states leads to an average action distribution of α. Let the long run average
state distribution be f , i.e.,
f(s) =
1
n
∑
i
1si=s (14)
where si is the state of the agent i. Then the above statement implies that α must satisfy
α(ai) =
∑
π−1(ai)
f(s) (15)
where π−1(x) represents the set of states for which ai ∈ π(x). This is equivalent to saying that if all the agents
follow the optimal oblivious strategy π ∈ P(α), then the long run average population state distribution f and the
long run average population action α satisfy f ∈ D(π, α) and α = Dˆ(π, f).
C. Optimal Oblivious Strategy Set is Non-Empty
In this subsection, we show that there exists an optimal oblivious strategy. More formally, we have the following
lemma.
Lemma 2. For the limiting population average action distribution α, the set of the optimal oblivious strategies
given by P(α) is non-empty. A policy π(s) ∈ P(α) if,
π(s, j) ∈ argmax
a∈A
{r¯M (s, a, α) + γ
∑
s′∈S
pM (s′|s, a, α)VMπ,j+1(s
′|α)} (16)
Proof. Note that r is bounded and Lipschitz continuous. In addition, for each state s, the next state is drawn from
a countable set. Further,
VMπ,ℓ(s|α) = EM,π


τ−1∑
j=ℓ
γj r¯M (sj , π(sj), α)|sℓ = s

 (17)
An oblivious strategy is optimal if and only if it attains a maximum on the right hand side of Eq. (16) for every s.
Since the reward is bounded, and γ < 1, thus, VMπ,ℓ is bounded for all ℓ = 0, 1, . . . , τ − 1 which means there exists
an optimal oblivious strategy that maximizes the RHS. Hence, the set P(α) for a given α is non-empty. Therefore
for each episode, there exists an optimal oblivious strategy which is given by πk ∈ P(αtk).
D. Sampling does not Lead to a Gap for Expected Value Function
In the last subsection, we proved that there exists an optimal oblivious strategy. In this subsection, we’ll show that
the expected optimal value function achieved by the algorithm and the true distribution is equal. We first describe
the Azuma-Hoeffding Lemma that will be used in the result.
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9Lemma 3. (Azuma-Hoeffding Lemma [6]) If Yn is a zero-mean martingale with almost surely bounded increments,
|Yi - Yi−1| ≤ C, then for any δ ≥ 0 with probability at least 1- δ, Yn ≤ C
√
2n log(1/δ).
At the start of every episode, each agent samples a probability distribution from the posterior distribution. The
following result bounds the difference between the optimal value function learned by the true distribution M∗
function using the optimal policy π∗ which is unknown, and the optimal value function achieved by the sampled
distribution Mk from the policy πk. (Here, Mtk is abbreviated to Mk)
Lemma 4. If the sampled distribution is chosen form Algorithm 1, we have the convergence of the optimal value
function of the sample distribution Mk, V
Mk
πk,j
(s|α)) to the optimal value function of the true distribution M∗,
VM
∗
π∗,j (s|α), i.e., for all states s ∈ S as k →∞,
VMkπk,j (s|α))− V
M∗
π∗,j (s|α)→ 0 (18)
Proof. To prove this, we first show an equivalence of the true distribution and the sampled distribution which comes
from the property of posterior sampling shown in [6], which says that for any σ− measurable function of history
Htk , we have
E[g(Mk)] = E[g(M
∗)] (19)
which can be applied to the difference of the optimal functions of the two distributions to show that for all states
s ∈ S,
E
[
VM
∗
π∗,j (s|α)− V
Mk
πk,j (s|α))
]
= 0 (20)
Note that the length of all episodes is given by τ and the support of the reward is [0,1]. Therefore for all states
s ∈ S, we have VM
∗
π∗,j (s|α) − V
Mk
πk,j
(s|α)) ∈ [−τ, τ ]. Note that this condition is similar to bounded increments in
Azuma-Hoeffding Lemma (Lemma 3).
Since VM
∗
π∗,j (s|α) − V
Mk
πk,j
(s|α) ∈ [−τ, τ ] is a zero mean martingale with respect to the filtration {Htk : k =
1, ..,m}, and satisfies the assumptions of Azuma-Hoeffding Lemma, we obtain the result as in the statement of the
Lemma. Also, for all states s ∈ S, we have, VM
∗
π∗,j (s|α)− V
Mk
πk,j
(s|α)) ∈ [−τ, τ ]. So, the difference is a zero-mean
martingale and has the bounded increments property. Applying the Azuma-Hoeffding Lemma to the martingale, we
have the following result,
m∑
k=1
VM
∗
π∗,j (s|α)− V
Mk
πk,j
(s|α) ≤ τ
√
2m log(1/δ) (21)
For total time T of the algorithm, we have m = T/τ . Thus, for all θ > 1/2, as T →∞, we have
∑⌈T/τ⌉
k=1 V
M∗
π∗,j (s|α) − V
Mk
πk,j
(s|α)
T θ
→ 0 (22)
Substituting θ = 1, the above expression says that τ times the average difference in an episode which converges
to zero as total time T →∞, which gives us the convergence of the optimal value functions of the two distributions.
Thus, we have
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VM
∗
π∗,j (s|α)− V
Mk
πk,j
(s|α)→ 0 as k →∞ (23)
E. Value Function Update Steps in Algorithm 1 Converge to the Actual Value Function
We have already shown the bound between the optimal value function achieved by the sampled and the true
distribution. In this subsection, we will show that if the policy π is chosen from Algorithm 1, the qj value converges
to the optimal QMkπk,j function. Further, the value function converges to the optimal function.
Lemma 5. The Q-value computed using the algorithm, qj converges to the optimal Q-value of the sampled
distribution given by QMkπk,j i.e.
max
s
max
a
|qj(s, a)−Q
Mk
πk,j
(s, a, α)| → 0 as k →∞ (24)
Proof. This result follows on the same lines as the convergence of Expected Sarsa algorithm [8], and is thus omitted.
The upadates use in the Algorihtm use learning rates which satisfy the conditions required for the convergence in
Expected Sarsa.
Having shown that the Q function converges, it is easy to see that the value function converges, and thus we
have
Theorem 2. The value function obtained from the Algorithm 1 converges to the optimal value function obtained
from the true distribution M∗ i.e.
max
s
|vjk(s)− V
M∗
π∗,j (s|α)| → 0 as k →∞ (25)
Proof. From Lemma 5, we note that the iterates of value function vjk(s) converge to the optimal value function of the
sampled distribution given by VMkπk,j (s|α). Also, by Lemma 4, the optimal value function of the sampled distribution
VMkπk,j (s|α) converges to the optimal value function achieved by the true distribution V
M∗
π∗,j (s|α). Combining these,
we obtain the result as in the statement of the theorem.
V. CONCLUSION
We consider an action coupled stochastic game consisting of large number of agents where the transition
probabilities are unknown to the agents. We resort to the concept of mean-field equilibrium where each agent’s
reward and the transition probability is only impacted through the mean distribution of the actions of the other agents.
When the number of agents grows large, the mean-field equilibrium becomes equivalent to the Nash equilibrium.
We propose a posterior sampling based approach where each agent draws a sample using an updated posterior
distribution and selects an optimal oblivious strategy accordingly. We show that the proposed algorithm converges
to the mean field equilibrium without knowing the transition probabilities apriori.
This paper shows asymptotic convergence to the mean-field equilibrium, while finding the convergence rate is
an interesting future direction.
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APPENDIX
We define the value function at ℓth time step as:
VMπ,ℓ (s|α) = EM,π


τ−1∑
j=ℓ
γj−ℓr¯M(sj , π(sj , j), α)|sℓ = s, π

 (26)
This can be further re-written as
VMπ,ℓ (s|α) = EM,π

r¯M(s, π(s, ℓ), α) +
τ−1∑
j=ℓ+1
γj−ℓr¯M(sj , π(sj , j), α)|sℓ+1 = s, π

 (27)
Separating the two terms inside the expectation and taking γ outside the expectation, we get
VMπ,ℓ (s|α) = EM,π
[
r¯M(s, π(s, ℓ), α)
]
+ γEM,π


τ−1∑
j=ℓ+1
γj−(ℓ+1)r¯M(sj , π(sj , j), α)|sℓ+1 = s, π

 (28)
After choosing the action π(s, ℓ) in state s, the agent transitions to the state s′ with transition probability
pM(s′|s, π(s, ℓ), α).
VMπ,ℓ (s|α) = r¯
M(s, π(s, ℓ), α) + γ
∑
s′∈S
pM (s′|s, π(s, ℓ+ 1), α)EM,π


τ−1∑
j=ℓ+1
γj−(ℓ+1)r¯M(sj , π(sj , j), α)|sℓ+1 = s
′, π


(29)
But VMπ,ℓ+1(s
′|α) = EM,π
[∑τ−1
j=ℓ+1 γ
j−(ℓ+1)r¯M(sj , π(sj , j), α)|sℓ+1 = s
′, π
]
, which gives
VMπ,ℓ (s|α = r¯
M(s, π(s, ℓ), α) + γ
∑
s′∈S
pM (s′|s, π(s, ℓ + 1), α)VMπ,ℓ+1(s
′|α) (30)
Thus, the above defined value functions satisfy the dynamic programming equations for finite-horizon MDPs.
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